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Security Analysis using Rank Functions
in CSP
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) is an abstract language for describing
processes and reasoning about their interactions within concurrent systems. It is appro-
priate for investigating the overall behaviour that emerges. It has a mature theory, and
powerful tool support [For03] and can be considered as an off-the-shelf framework which
can be customised for particular domains through additional domain-specific construc-
tions and theory. This chapter introduces the application of CSP to the analysis of secu-
rity protocols. For the purposes of this chapter, we will introduce only those parts of CSP
that we use in protocol analysis. Fuller descriptions of the language and theory can be
found in [Hoa85,Ros97,Sch99].
1. Review of CSP
In CSP, processes are described in terms of the events that they can perform. Events are
occurrences in the lifetime of a process, including communications with other processes,
as well as other actions that they might be performing. In our context, events will typ-
ically have several components, such as trans.A.B.m representing communication of a
message m over channel trans.A.B. Messages will themselves have some specific struc-
tures (to include encryption and signing), and are drawn from a defined set of messages.
Processes are described in terms of the patterns of events that they can perform, and
there are a number of process constructors:
Prefix If e is an event, and P is a process, then e → P is the process which initially is
prepared only to perform event e, after which it behaves as P.
Output For a channel c and value v, the process c!v → P outputs v along channel c, and
subsequently behaves as P. Semantically it is equivalent to c.v → P, with the ‘!’
symbol used to indicate output.
Input If P(x) is a family of processes indexed by x, then c?x → P(x) is a process which
initially reads a value v on channel c, and subsequently behaves as P(v). We also
make frequent use of pattern matching. We can input messages of a particular
form or with some particular values, by giving the general pattern. Only inputs
which match the pattern are accepted, and the variables in the pattern are bound
according to the value received. For example, to accept triples in which the second
value is 3, we could use the input c?(x, 3, y) → P(x, y). As another example, to
accept messages encrypted only with a particular key K we could use the input
c?{|m|}sK → P(m).
Termination The process STOP indicates termination (or deadlock): this process can
perform no further events.
Choice If P(i) is a finite or infinite family of processes indexed by i ∈ I, then the process
i P(i) offers the choice of all of the P(i) processes, and can behave as any of
them. The choice is made on occurrence of the first event.
Interleaving The process |||i P(i) is the interleaving of all of the P(i) processes. All of
the P(i) processes run independently and concurrently, and can be scheduled in
any order. There is also a binary form P ||| Q.
Parallel The parallel combination P |[A ]|Q of two processes runs P and Q concurrently,
but they must synchronise on all events in the set A. This synchronisation mecha-
nism is the way in which processes interact with each other. For example, the pro-
cesses in (c!v → P) ‖ (c?x → Q(x)) share the channel c, so the parallel combina-
tion will communicate the value v along c, and subsequently behave as P ‖ Q(v). If
A is a singleton set {a} then the set brackets may be elided. Thus the combination
P |[ a ]| STOP behaves as P blocked on the event a.
Recursion Processes can be defined recursively, using (parameterised) process names:
the definition N(p) =̂ P(p) defines process N(p) with parameter p to behave as
P(p). The name N also appears in the body of P, corresponding to a recursive call.
The language also includes internal choice, abstraction, timeout, event renaming, and
interrupts, but these are not needed here so will not be considered further.
The semantic foundation we will use is the traces model for CSP. A trace is a (fi-
nite) sequence of events. Traces are written as sequences of events listed between angled
brackets: 〈e1, . . . , en〉.
The traces model associates every CSP process with a set of traces, consisting of
all the traces that might possibly be observed in some execution of that process. For
example,
traces(in?x → out!x → STOP) = {〈〉}
∪ {〈in.v | v ∈ M〉}
∪ {〈in.v, out.v | v ∈ M〉}
where M is the type of channel in.
The theory of CSP gives ways of reasoning directly about the set of traces of any
system described in CSP.
Specifications are concerned with allowable system behaviours. A trace specifica-
tion will describe which traces are allowable, and a CSP system can then be checked
against the specification by considering all its traces and demonstrating that they are all
acceptable. We write P sat S to indicate that every trace of traces(P) meets the predicate
S. For example, consider the predicate a precedes b defined on traces as follows:
a precedes b = (last(tr) = b ⇒ a in tr)
Then
(a → b → STOP) sat a precedes b
2. Protocol modeling and verification
We will apply this framework to security protocol analysis. This involves developing a
CSP model of a system which expresses the protocol, and specifying the security prop-
erty to be considered. In order to judge the CSP model against the specification we make
use of the ‘rank function theorem’ which is at the heart of the approach. We use the
Handshake protocol of Chapter ?? as a running example, and begin with the standard
notation:
A → B :
{∣∣∣[A.B.k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B) [k fresh]
B → A : {|s|}sk
This protocol description is written in terms of the messages to be exchanged between the
protocol participants, and describes how each protocol participant is expected to behave.
In order to model this protocol in CSP, we need to define the set of possible mes-
sages that can be communicated. For this protocol we must consider that messages can
be constructed using concatenation, shared key encryption, public key encryption, and
signing. Participant identifiers, shared keys, and plain text are available as message com-
ponents. We define the space of messages as follows, and consider all messages in the
CSP model to come from this set:
M1, M2 ::= messages
I (∈ USER) agent identities
S (∈ PLAIN) plaintext
K (∈ KEY) shared keys
M1.M2 concatenation of messages
{|M|}sK symmetric encryption of message M by key K
{|M|}apk(I) asymmetric encryption of message M by agent I’s public key
[M]sk(I) signing of message M with agent I’s signature key
We assume sets USER of user identifiers; PLAIN of plaintext messages (from which the
payload in message 2 is drawn), and KEY of shared keys. This approach treats messages
that are constructed differently as different, thus building into the model that any par-
ticular message can be constructed in only one way, an assumption known as perfect
encryption [PQ00].
We are now in a position to model the protocol participants. The protocol initiator,
denoted A, chooses a fresh key k and a protocol partner j, assembles the first message
by signing and then encrypting with j’s public key, and transmits it to j. A then awaits a
message encrypted with the key k. A’s run of the protocol may be described in CSP as
follows:
INITA(k) =j trans.A!j.
{∣∣∣[A.j.k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(j)
→ rec.A.j?{|s|}sk → STOP
We use channel trans for outputs from a protocol participant, and channel rec for inputs.
trans.A.j.m is a transmission of message m from A, intended for B. As we shall see in the
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Figure 1. Attacker inference rules
model, we allow for the fact that it might not reach B. Observe the initial choice of j, and
the use of pattern matching in the received message: the key of the input message must
be k, though any message s can be accepted as the contents.
The protocol responder, denoted B, receives an initial message signed by i and en-
crypted with his public key pk(B). That message contains a key k, which B then uses to
encrypt a response s.
RESPB(s) = rec.B?i?
{∣∣∣[i.B.k]sk(i)∣∣∣}apk(B)
→ trans.B!i{|s|}sk → STOP
We must also model the hostile environment within which A and B communicate.
We use the Dolev-Yao model [DY83], in which the attacker has complete control of the
network. Messages are transmitted to the attacker for forwarding to the intended recip-
ient; and messages received come from the attacker. The attacker can also divert, in-
vent, replay, destroy, and alter messages. We also assume that the attacker can participate
in protocol runs as a legitimate user, so some of the user identities in USER are under
the control of the attacker (i.e. the attacker can decrypt messages encrypted under their
public keys, and can sign with their signature keys).
Conversely, the attacker may not decrypt messages without possession of the de-
cryption key; nor sign messages without knowledge of the signature key. The messages
that the attacker is able to generate, and thus use in an attack, are limited by the attacker’s
knowledge. Figure 2 gives the rules that govern how the attacker can generate new mes-
sages: 	 is defined as the smallest relation closed under all of these rules. Thus S 	 m
means that the attacker can construct message m from the set of messages S. Note that
rules DECRYPTION 2 and SIGNING encapsulate the assumption that the attacker controls
any users other than A and B.
The CSP model of the attacker will be a process ENEMY parameterised by the set
S of messages that the attacker knows. This will be a combination of those messages
known initially, together with those sent out by protocol participants. ENEMY(S) can
receive any message m from any user i sent to any other user j, in which case the set S
is augmented with m. ENEMY(S) can also supply any message m that can be generated
from S, to any user i, as if it came from user j.
ENEMY(S) = trans?i?j?m → ENEMY(S ∪ {m})

 i∈USER
j∈USER
m|Sm
rec!i!j!m → ENEMY(S)
This defines the threat model in terms of attacker capabilities. Correctness in the context
of this attacker indicates that there are no attacks from an attacker with these capabilities.
The attacker behaviour includes the possibility of passing messages on correctly, as well
as the standard manouevres used in attacks: blocking, redirecting, spoofing, combining,
dissecting, and replaying messages. However, the key point in this model is that the
attacker is unable to attack the cryptographic mechanisms.
The definition of the attacker in the model will need to identify the initial knowledge:
a set IK of messages that the attacker is considered to have available initially. This will
include all user names, some plaintext, and some session keys. However, any fresh keys
or text used by honest agents in protocol runs will not be in IK, to model our expectation
that the attacker should not be able to guess them. The attacker can learn them only
through protocol runs.
We then define ENEMY to be ENEMY(IK).
A model of a single run of the protocol with A as initiator and B as responder, with
specific key kAB and secret sAB will be:
SYS = (INITA(kAB) ||| RESPB(sAB)) |[ trans, rec ]|ENEMY
A and B do not synchronise on any events directly: all of their communications are via
ENEMY. On the other hand trans and rec are in the alphabets of both sides of the parallel
operator, so all occurrences of trans and rec involve one of the protocol participants, and
also ENEMY. Thus ENEMY is involved in all communications within the system.
SYS describes a model involving just a single pair of protocol participants A and B
on a single run of the protocol. In order to explain the essence of the approach we will
consider this model through the majority of this chapter. However, this can be generalised
to the case of arbitrarily many concurrent runs, discussed in Section 5.
2.1. Specification
Having developed the model of the protocol, we now consider the properties that we wish
to demonstrate. We will consider authentication of each party by the other, and secrecy.
Authentication is concerned with establishing the identity of the other party. If A
runs the protocol with B, then the intention is that by the end of the protocol run A can
be confident that the protocol was indeed run with B. From B’s point of view, B wishes
to be confident that a protocol run apparently with A was indeed with A.
A B{∣∣∣[A.B.k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B)
respgo.B.A.s.k
{|s|}sk
initdone.A.B.s.k
Figure 2. Introducing specification events for A authenticating B
This can be captured within the traces of SYS, stating that any trace which includes a
protocol run of A with B should also contain a protocol run of B with A. However, we find
it cleaner to introduce particular specification events into the protocol to state explicitly
that a protocol participant has reached a particular stage, and what information they have
used in that protocol run. By instrumenting the protocol with such events we can give
specifications directly on those events rather than implicitly in terms of the sequence of
events that have gone previously.
Thus for A to authenticate B we add an event initdone.A.B.s.k which A uses to signal
completion of a protocol run with B, with key k, where s is the plaintext that has been
received in message 2. We also add an event respgo.B.A.s.k into B’s run to indicate that
B is running the protocol with A, with plaintext s, and with key k received in message 1.
For authentication, respgo needs to appear causally prior to initdone in the protocol run.
The placement of these additional events is illustrated in Figure 2.
The precise authentication property can be varied by varying the specification
events selected. Agreement purely on the key is captured by the pair initdone.A.B.k and
respgo.B.A.k; agreement only on the protocol participants would be captured by using
the pair initdone.A.B and respgo.B.A. This would provide A with assurance that the other
participant is B, but no assurance that they agree on the key k or text s. A hierarchy of
authentication properties is discussed in [Low97].
To consider the authentication property, the descriptions of INIT A and RESPB are
adjusted to incorporate these specification events:
INITA(kAB) = trans.A!B.
{∣∣∣[A.B.kAB]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B)
→ rec.A.B?{|s|}skAB
→ initdone.A.B.s.kAB → STOP
RESPB(sAB) = rec.B?j?
{∣∣∣[j.B.k]sk(j)∣∣∣}apk(B)
→ respgo.B.j.sAB.k
→ trans.B!j{|sAB|}sk → STOP
The authentication property from A’s point of view is that whenever the signal
even initdone.A.B.s.k occurs with specific s and k, then respgo.B.A.s.k should previously
have occurred, with the same s and k. This will indicate that B is running the protocol,
with A, and that they agree on the content of the protocol run. This requirement as a
trace specification is that any trace of SYS which contains initdone.A.B.s.k also contains
respgo.B.A.s.k. The attacker cannot perform initdone or respgo events since they have
been introduced purely for the purposes of specification—they are modeling points in
the protocol rather than communications that the attacker can engage in.
A violation of the property will be a trace of SYS in which A performs initdone.A.B.s.k
without B having previously performed the corresponding respgo.B.A.s.k. In that case
A will have been brought to a point where the protocol run apparently with B has com-
pleted, but B has not been involved in the same protocol run. This will be either because
there is a mistake in the protocol, or because an attack is possible.
We fix on (arbitrary) key kAB and text sAB, and consider authentication with respect
to these. The form of specification SYS is required to satisfy is then
respgo.B.A.kAB.sAB precedes initdone.A.B.kAB.sAB
which states that any trace in which the initdone event appears must have the correspond-
ing respgo appear earlier in the trace.
2.2. A general theorem for proving authentication
The following theorem gives conditions for establishing that an event a precedes another
event b in a network SYS consisting of a number of users USER i in parallel with ENEMY.
It makes use of a rank function ρ which associates messages and signals with integers. If
every component within the system can only introduce messages of positive rank when
a is blocked, and if b has non-positive rank, then it follows that b cannot occur when a is
blocked. Thus in the unblocked system any occurrence of b must follow an occurrence
of a.
In the theorem, conditions 1 and 2 establish that ENEMY cannot introduce messages
of non-positive rank; condition 3 states that b has non-positive rank; and condition 4
states that if each user i only receives messages of positive rank, then it can communicate
messages and signals only of positive rank.
Rank Function Theorem
If ρ : MESSAGE ∪ SIGNAL → Z is such that:
1. ∀m ∈ IK.ρ(m) > 0
2. ∀ S ⊆ MESSAGE.(ρ(S) > 0 ∧ S 	 m) ⇒ ρ(m) > 0
3. ρ(b)  0
4. ∀ i.(USERi |[ a ]| Stop) sat ρ(tr  rec) > 0 ⇒ ρ(tr) > 0
then (|||i USERi) |[ trans, rec ]|ENEMY sat a precedes b. 
In condition 4, the notation tr  rec denotes the projection of trace tr onto the channel
rec: in other words, the subsequence of rec events occurring within tr. This requirement
on USERi blocked on a is that if only positive rank messages are received, then no non-
positive rank message should be produced.
We have abused notation and extended ρ to apply not only to messages and signals,
but also to events, traces, and sets:
• ρ(c.m) = ρ(m)
• ρ(S) = min{ρ(s) | s ∈ S}
• ρ(tr) = min{ρ(s) | s in tr}
For any particular protocol specification the challenge is to identify a suitable ρ that
meets the conditions. Identification of such a ρ establishes correctness of the protocol
with respect to that specification.
2.3. Application of the theorem
We require in this particular case that:
1. every message in IK has positive rank;
2. if every message in a set S has positive rank, and S 	 m, then m has positive rank;
3. initdone.A.B.kAB.sAB does not have positive rank;
4. INITA(kAB) maintains positive rank: if it has only received messages of positive
rank then it only outputs messages of positive rank. Note that
INIT(kAB) |[ respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB ]| STOP = INITA(kAB);
5. RESPB(sAB) |[ respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB ]| STOP maintains positive rank: if it has only
received messages of positive rank then it only outputs messages of positive rank.
Observe we are considering RESPB with the respgo event blocked.
If we can find a rank function that meets all these conditions, then we will have estab-
lished that SYS satisfies respgo.B.A.kAB.sAB precedes initdone.A.B.kAB.sAB, and hence
that the protocol provides the authentication guarantee required.
Figure 3 gives a rank function that meets all of the required properties.
1. We assume that kAB ∈ IK since it is fresh for user A. Thus all the messages in IK
will have positive rank.
2. This condition is established inductively over the inference rules. In particular,
we can check for each rule in turn that if it is true for the premisses, then it is also
true for the conclusion.
3. initdone.A.B.kAB.sAB does not have positive rank, by definition of ρ.
4. INITA(kAB) maintains positive rank. It outputs a single protocol message, which
has positive rank; and it can only perform the final initdone.A.B.s AB.kAB event if
it has previously received a message of rank 0: a message encrypted with k AB.
Thus if it only receives messages of positive rank it will only perform events of
positive rank.
5. It is useful first to expand the restricted RESPB:
RESPB(sAB) |[ respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB ]| STOP
= rec.B?j?
{∣∣∣[j.B.k]sk(j)∣∣∣}apk(B) → if (j = A ∧ k = kAB)then STOP
else respgo.B.j.sAB.k
→ trans.B!j{|sAB|}sk → STOP
The only time B can send a message of rank 0 is when the received key k is in fact
kAB. In this case we must have j = A to reach that point in the restricted protocol.
ρ(i) = 1
ρ(s) = 1
ρ(k) =
{
0 if k = kAB
1 otherwise
ρ(m1.m2) = min{ρ(m1).ρ(m2)}
ρ({|m|}sk) =
{
0 if k = kAB
ρ(m) otherwise
ρ({|m|}apk(i)) =
{
1 if i = B ∧ m = [A.B.k′]sk(A)
ρ(m) otherwise
ρ([m]sk(i)) =
{
0 if m = i.B.kAB
ρ(m) otherwise
ρ(sig) =
{
0 if sig = initdone.A.B.sAB.kAB
1 otherwise
Figure 3. A rank function for authentication
But then the rank of the received message is 0: ρ(
{∣∣∣[j.B.k]sk(j)∣∣∣}apk(B)) = 0. Hence
transmission of a message or rank 0 follows receipt of a message of rank 0. Thus
RESPB(sAB) |[ respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB ]| STOP maintains positive rank.
We can conclude that A’s run of the protocol authenticates B.
2.4. Protocol simplification
If the participants are removed from message 1 of the protocol, then we obtain the sim-
plified (flawed) version:
A → B :
{∣∣∣[k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B)
B → A : {|s|}sk
We will consider how this simplification affects the correctness proof.
The natural change to make to the rank function is to change the message in the
definition of ρ to follow the change in the protocol, resulting in the following alternative
clauses (the other clauses are unaffected):
ρ({|m|}apk(i)) =
{
1 if i = B ∧ m = [k′]sk(A)
ρ(m) otherwise
ρ([m]sk(i)) =
{
0 if m = kAB
ρ(m) otherwise
The models for analysis also change to reflect the simpler first message:
INITA(kAB)
= trans.A!B.
{∣∣∣[kAB]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B) → rec.A.B?{|s|}skAB → initdone.A.B.s.kAB→ STOP
RESPB(sAB) |[ respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB ]| STOP
= rec.B?j?
{∣∣∣[k]sk(j)∣∣∣}apk(B) → if (j = A ∧ k = kAB)then STOP
else respgo.B.j.sAB.k
→ trans.B!j{|sAB|}sk → STOP
We find that the revised rank function with the revised CSP models still meets all
the rank function properties. Thus the simplified (flawed!) protocol still establishes the
authentication property that A authenticates B, and they agree on the session key k AB and
the secret message sAB. Although flawed in other ways, it still provides this authentication
property.
3. Responder authenticating initiator
The previous section verified that the initiator authenticates the responder. We are also
concerned with authentication in the other direction. The same approach is taken: a pair
of events to specify authentication are introduced into the model of the protocol; a suit-
able model of a protocol run is defined in CSP, this time from the responder’s point of
view; a rank function is identified which meets the properties of the rank function theo-
rem, establishing the authentication property.
The authenticating events in this instance are respdone and initgo. The event
respdone occurs after the message received from A. The event initgo should be causally
prior to that message, so must occur before A’s first communication. At that point A
has the key k but not s, so the event will be initgo.A.B.k. This should be followed by
respgo.B.A.k. This is pictured in Figure 4.
In the CSP model to analyse for this property, we are concerned with B’s use of the
first protocol message in authenticating the initiator. We therefore fix the user A that B is
responding to, and the key kAB that B receives in that message.
Since this authentication property is relative to B, we model A as being able to initiate
with any party j, and with any key k. The rank function theorem requires restriction
on initgo.A.B.kAB. We therefore obtain the following processes for the initiator and the
responder, which should maintain positive ρ for any proposed rank function ρ:
INITA |[ initgo.A.B.kAB ]| STOP =
j,k if j = B ∧ k = kAB
then STOP
else initgo.A.j.k → trans.A!j.
{∣∣∣[A.j.k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(j) → rec.A.j?{|s|}sk → STOP
initgo.A.B.k
A B{∣∣∣[A.B.k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B)
respdone.B.A.k
{|s|}sk
Figure 4. Introducing specification events for B authenticating A
RESPB(sAB, kAB) =
rec.B.A?
{∣∣∣[A.B.kAB]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B) → respdone.B.A.kAB → trans.B!A{|sAB|}skAB→ STOP
The following rank function meets all the conditions of the rank function theorem:
ρ(i) = 1
ρ(s) = 1
ρ(k) = 1
ρ(m1.m2) = min{ρ(m1).ρ(m2)}
ρ({|m|}sk) = ρ(m)
ρ({|m|}apk(i)) = ρ(m)
ρ([m]sk(i)) =
{
0 if i = A ∧ m = A.B.kAB
ρ(m) otherwise
ρ(sig) =
{
0 if sig = respdone.B.A.kAB
1 otherwise
This rank function captures the requirement that the enemy cannot generate or obtain
the message [A.B.kAB]sk(A), even if it knows kAB (note that ρ(kAB) = 1, allowing for the
enemy to be able to generate it). This fact is sufficient to guarantee to B that A must have
initiated the protocol run with B, with key kAB, establishing authentication.
3.1. Protocol simplification
As previously, if the participants are removed from message 1 of the protocol, then we
obtain the simplified version:
A → B :
{∣∣∣[k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B)
B → A : {|s|}sk
The revised CSP protocol descriptions are:
INITA |[ initgo.A.B.kAB ]| STOP =
j,k if j = B ∧ k = kAB
then STOP
else initgo.A.j.k → trans.A!j.
{∣∣∣[k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(j) → rec.A.j?{|s|}sk → STOP
RESPB(sAB, kAB) =
rec.B.A?
{∣∣∣[kAB]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B) → respdone.B.A.kAB → trans.B!A{|sAB|}skAB → STOP
The natural change to the rank function is in the clause for signed messages, which
becomes:
ρ({|m|}ask(i)) =
{
0 if i = A ∧ m = kAB
ρ(m) otherwise
However, we now find that INITA |[ initgo.A.B.kAB ]| STOP no longer meets condition
4 of the rank function theorem, since if k = kAB and j = B then it can communicate
trans.A.j.
{∣∣∣[kAB]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(j) and thus transmit a communication of rank 0 without having
first received one.
Two responses to this observation are possible: either seek another rank function
which does work; or explore if the reason the rank function fails is because there is an
attack. In this case there is an attack, indicating the flaw shown in Chapter ??: B accepts
the first message as evidence that A has initiated the protocol with B, but in fact A might
have initiated it with a different party. The following attack is possible:
α : A → E :
{∣∣∣[kAB]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(E)
β : E(A) → B :
{∣∣∣[kAB]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B)
β : B → E(A) : {|s0|}skAB
The predicate initgo.A.B.kAB precedes respdone.B.A.kAB is not met by the trace corre-
sponding to this attack. The ‘confirmation’ signal respdone.B.A.k AB is in fact preceded
by initgo.A.E.kAB. Hence the authentication property is not satisfied by the simplified
protocol.
4. Secrecy
There are also secrecy requirements on this protocol.
SECRECY INIT The secrecy requirement for the initiator is that if s is accepted as
secret after the protocol run, then s should not be known to the intruder (provided
the responder is honest).
SECRECY RESP Similarly, the secrecy requirement for the responder is that if s is
sent in the protocol run, then it should not be known to the intruder (provided the
initiator is honest).
The assumption of honesty in the other party is natural, since the secret is being shared
with them—if the other party is dishonest then there can be no guarantees about secrecy.
For reasons of space we will carry out the analysis for SECRECY RESP. The anal-
ysis for SECRECY INIT is very similar.
4.1. Modeling for secrecy analysis
The intruder’s acquisition of message s can be modeled by its capability to perform
trans.E.E.s or some other communication demonstrating possession of s. To establish
that such communications cannot occur it is sufficient to provide a rank function such
that s has rank 0. Secrecy is concerned with the impossibility of a particular commu-
nication, rather than establishing a precedence relationship between two events. Use-
fully, this can be expressed in the form required by the rank function theorem. The rank
function theorem can be applied by introducing an impossible event imp which no par-
ticipant performs: the statement imp precedes trans.E.E.s is equivalent to requiring
that trans.E.E.s can never occur (since imp can never occur). Expressing it in the form
imp precedes trans.E.E.s allows direct application of the rank function theorem. Ob-
serve that in this case no additional specification events need to be introduced, and since
imp is not in the alphabet of any process, restricting the system’s behaviour on imp makes
no difference to the behaviour of any of the participants.
4.1.1. SECRECY RESP
The model for analysis of secrecy with respect to the responder B fixes on A as the
initiator. RESPB therefore describes a run with A. The initiator A is modeled as following
the protocol faithfully (since B assumes A is honest), though possibly with a different
participant. Thus A chooses an arbitrary party j with whom to run the protocol.
INITA(k0) =
j trans.A!j.
{∣∣∣[A.j.k0]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(j) → rec.A.B?{|s|}sk0 → STOP
RESPB(s0) =rec.B.A?
{∣∣∣[A.B.k]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B) → trans.B!A{|s0|}sk → STOP
The secret sent by B is s0, so any suitable rank function will necessarily assign s0 a rank
of 0.
The following rank function meets all the conditions of the rank function theorem:
ρ(i) = 1
ρ(s) =
{
0 if s = s0
1 otherwise
ρ(k) =
{
0 if k = k0
1 otherwise
ρ(m1.m2) = min{ρ(m1).ρ(m2)}
ρ({|m|}sk) =
{
1 if k = k0 ∧ s = s0
ρ(m) otherwise
ρ({|m|}apk(i)) =
{
1 if i = B ∧ m = [A.B.k0]sk(A)
ρ(m) otherwise
ρ([m]sk(i)) =
{
0 if i = A ∧ m = A.B.k
ρ(m) otherwise
The clause for ρ([m]sk(i) captures the fact that the enemy cannot obtain any message
of the form [A.B.k]sk(A). This is the key to how the protocol provides the secrecy property:
that B can be assured that any such signed message must indeed have been generated by
A, and hence that the key k is not known to the attacker.
4.2. The simplified version
For the simplified version of the protocol, the natural change to make to the rank function
is to simplify the messages in the definition of ρ, resulting in the following alternative
clauses (the other clauses are unaffected):
ρ({|m|}apk(i)) =
{
1 if i = B ∧ m = [k0]sk(A)
ρ(m) otherwise
ρ([m]sk(i)) =
{
0 if i = A ∧ m = k(∈ KEY)
ρ(m) otherwise
However, we now find that condition 4 for a rank function no longer holds: INIT A can
immediately transmit a message of rank 0: the message
{∣∣∣[k0]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(E). In this case this
leads us to the following attack:
α : A → E :
{∣∣∣[k0]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(E)
β : E(A) → B :
{∣∣∣[k0]sk(A)∣∣∣}apk(B)
β : B → E(A) : {|s0|}sk0
The responder relies on the contents of the first message (i.e. the session key) being se-
cret. However, in the simplified case it might have gone to another party before reaching
the responder, hence the protocol is flawed with respect to responder secrecy. In the orig-
inal version, the inclusion of the identifiers A and B are sufficient for B to know that A
encrypted the first message with B’s public key, ensuring secrecy of the session key and
hence the payload.
Multiple runs
In general, several concurrent runs of the protocol might take place simultaneously, and
protocol participants might be involved in more than one protocol run, possibly in differ-
ent roles.
The general behaviour of such a protocol participant can be described within CSP,
as an interleaving of initiator and responder runs, each with an arbitrary protocol partner.
A general initiator run and a general responder run are first defined, and then a user is
constructed from collections of these. Fresh messages required for the runs are modeled
by requiring each run uses a different such message, and different agents all use different
messages.
A general initiator run for user C with a fresh key k chooses a partner j and runs the
protocol:
INITC(k) =
j trans.C.j.
{∣∣∣[C.j.k]sk(C)∣∣∣}apk(j) → rec.C.j?{|s|}sk → initdone.C.j.s.k → STOP
A general responder run for user C with a fresh secret s is ready to engage in the
protocol: it awaits contact from an initiator i and then follows the protocol with i:
RESPC(s) =
rec.C?i?
{∣∣∣[i.C.k]sk(i)∣∣∣}apk(C → respgo.C.i.s.k → trans.C!i{|s|}sk → STOP
A general participant C can then engage in arbitrarily many protocol runs concur-
rently as sender and receiver. This is captured as the interleaving of initiator and respon-
der runs:
USERC = (|||k∈KEYC INITC(k)) ||| (|||s∈MSGC RESP(s))
Observe that in this description each initiator run has a different key k, and each respon-
der run has a different message s. Each agent C has its own set of fresh keys KEY C and
messages MSGC, and in the model these will be pairwise disjoint so any fresh key or
message is associated with at most one agent.
As an example of how the general case can be established, we will consider the
property respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB precedes initdone.A.B.sAB.kAB: that A authenticates B. In
fact we can use the same rank function, given in Figure 3 as we used in the case of a
single protocol run. The composition rules of Figure 5 allow the proof obligations on
USERC to be reduced to individual runs.
Checking that USERC |[ respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB ]| STOP sat maintains ρ then reduces
(by rule INTERLEAVING of Figure 5) to checking the following:
• that each INITC(k) |[ respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB ]| STOP sat maintains ρ;
• that each RESPC(s) |[ respgo.B.A.sAB.kAB ]| STOP sat maintains ρ.
These each reduce to consideration of the possible cases. We will work through INIT C(k)
as an example.
INITC(k) sat maintains ρ as long as the initiating message has positive rank. Thus
by rule CHOICE we must show that
{∣∣∣[C.j.k]sk(C)∣∣∣}apk(j) has positive rank, for any C, j,
and k ∈ KEYC.
INTERLEAVING
∀ i.(Pi sat maintains ρ)
|||i Pi sat maintains ρ
CHOICE
∀ i.(Pi sat maintains ρ)
i Pi sat maintains ρ
Figure 5. Composition rules for maintains ρ
• Case 1: If j = B and C = A and k = kAB then ρ(
{∣∣∣[C.j.k]sk(C)∣∣∣}apk(j)) = 1 from
the definition of ρ.
• Case 2: Otherwise ρ(
{∣∣∣[C.j.k]sk(C)∣∣∣}apk(j)) = ρ([C.j.k]sk(C))
• Subcase 2.1: If j = B and k = kAB, then C = A. This follows from the fact
that kAB ∈ KEYC for some unique C, but for the particular key k AB we know that
kAB ∈ KEYA. Hence j = B, k = kAB, and C = A. But this is case 1, so ASubcase
2.1 is impossible.
• Subcase 2.2: j = B or k = kAB. Then ρ([C.j.k]sk(C)) = ρ(C.j.k). If k = kAB then
C = A, and we also have from the model that kAB is the key used in a session
A initiates with B, thus we have j = B, contradicting the condition for the case.
Otherwise k = kAB, so ρ(k) = 1. Then ρ(C.j.k) = 1, so ρ(
{∣∣∣[C.j.k]sk(C)∣∣∣}apk(j)) =
1 as required.
In all cases therefore we have that ρ(
{∣∣∣[C.j.k]sk(C)∣∣∣}apk(j)) = 1, establishing that
INITC(k) sat maintains ρ.
A similar consideration of the cases in the responder definition establishes that each
RESPC(s) |[ respgo.B.A.kAB.sAB ]| STOP sat maintains ρ.
Combining all these results yields that USERC |[ respgo.B.A.kAB.sAB ]| STOP sat
maintains ρ for all users C, establishing condition 4 of the rank function theorem.
In this way we can prove that the protocol does allow the initiator to authenticate
the responder in the fully general case allowing any number of concurrent protocol runs
between any participants.
5. Extensions
This chapter has introduced the approach of using rank functions to the analysis and
verification of security protocols. We have shown how protocols can be instrumented
with signals to allow various flavours of authentication properties to be expressed (more
detailed discussion of the flavours of authentication can be found in [Low97,Sch98b,
SBS09]), and also shown how secrecy can be specified. The rank function approach was
first presented in [Sch97,Sch98b], and expounded at greater length in [RSG +00]. An
introduction to the approach also appeared in [SD04] as an application area of CSP.
The basic approach has been extended in a number of ways, both in terms of ex-
tending the theory and in terms of developing tool support. A rank function approach
was developed to handle non-repudiation protocols [Sch98a] in which parties each seek
evidence from the other that the protocol has taken place, to prevent the other party
from repudiating the transaction at a later date. In such cases, each party in the protocol
is untrusted by the other, and is effectively modeled as the enemy. The aim is to col-
lect sufficient evidence to convince a third party that the other protocol party must have
participated—essentially that the evidence produced can only follow some activity by
the other protocol party, in much the same way as an authentication property.
An approach to handling timestamps was presented in [ES00,Eva03]. Timestamps
are another common mechanism used within security protocols to provide assurances of
freshness and prevent replay attacks. Their handling requires the modeling of the passage
of time, the protocol parties’ awareness of the correct time and ability to make decisions,
and the fact that some delays between message creation and message receipt must be al-
lowed for. An authentication protocol will aim to establish that if a timestamped message
is received at a particular time then it must have been generated within some previous
time window.
Some cryptographic schemes have particular properties (for example, commutativ-
ity of encryption) useful for constructing protocol schemes, but which might allow other
possibilities of attack. The rank function approach extends to handle these cases, where
the properties can be captured as equations on messages, or as further message deriva-
tion clauses (in the ‘generates’ relation’). In one example, an analysis of Gong’s proto-
col built around exclusive-or [Gon89] was presented in [Sch02]. Exclusive-or has sev-
eral properties, such as commutativity, self-inverse of encryption keys, and cancellation
properties. The analysis modeled these as equations on the algebra of messages, and the
additional requirement on a rank function is that it must be well-defined in the context
of the equations: if two (differently constructed) messages are equal, then they should
have the same rank. Since rank functions tend to be defined by induction over the BNF
for constructing messages, establishing well-definedness is an additional requirement.
This approach was also used in [DS07] for a class of group Diffie-Hellman authenticated
key-agreement protocols: keys can be constructed using exponentiation in a number of
different ways, and it is important that all constructions of the same key have the same
rank.
The approach has also been extended to handle various forms of forward secrecy.
Forward secrecy can be taken to mean that the payload of the protocol is secret even if
some secret elements of the protocol, such as a session key, become known to the attacker
at a later stage. In this case, the classical rank function considers either that the enemy
will never obtain the message, or that the enemy might as well have it from the beginning.
However, this approach is not appropriate for temporary secrets such as session keys.
Instead, in [Del06,DS07] the notion of a rank function is generalised to a temporal rank
function so that ranks range across positive integers (together with infinity), which may
be thought of as corresponding to the time at which a message might be available to the
enemy. This allows analysis of protocols which rely on the secrecy of some information
at a particular point in time. A generalised version of the rank function theorem is able
to establish long-term secrecy of messages in these cases.
In the context of group protocols, concern can also focus on whether secrets es-
tablished by honest members of a group can be exposed at some other stage if an
enemy joins the group. The rank function approach has been applied in this context
[GT07,Gaw08] for both forward secrecy (secret keys cannot be obtained from later runs)
and backward secrecy (secret keys cannot be obtained from earlier runs).
Various forms of tool support have been developed for the rank function approach, in
some cases with underlying theory to underpin the approach. A theory of rank functions
on top of CSP was developed in the theorem-prover PVS [DS97]. This theory allowed
definitions of rank functions, CSP descriptions of protocol participants, and verification
of the conditions of the rank function theorem. Since much of the work in carrying out
such a proof is mechanical house-keeping the provision of tool support is natural. The
PVS theories for CSP and for rank functions were refactored and extended (to handle
time) in [Eva03,ES05]. PVS has also been used to implement inference systems based on
rank functions to check whether attacks are possible [GBT09]. In this approach, various
properties of a rank function are given, and the inference system is used to establish
whether an attack is possible from the protocol rules.
As an alternative to theorem-proving, an approach for automatically generating a
rank function for a given protocol was developed in [Hea00,HS00]. This approach con-
structs a minimal function whose positive messages include those of the enemy’s initial
knowledge, are closed under the message generation rules, and are closed under the pro-
tocol agents’ behaviour for outputting. If the resulting function also gives a rank of 0 to
the authenticating message, then it meets all the conditions of the rank function theorem,
and the protocol is verified. Conversely if the resulting function gives a positive rank,
then there can be no rank function that will meet all the conditions of the rank function
theorem.
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